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Abstract 
 
I argue that pessimistic inductions over the history of science have not made the case that 
the failures of our predecessors give us reason to dial down our confidence in our 
scientific theories. I explain why an effective pessimistic induction must do more than 
meets the eye; it must show that 1) the supposed unreliability of our predecessors is 
relevant to what we should think about our own reliability, and 2) if we believe that we 
are lacking reliability – a second-order property – then we are rationally obligated to 
withdraw confidence in our first-order beliefs. I assist the pessimist by providing an 
account of fallibility that explains why the second is true. However, I show that the fact 
that we use different methods than our predecessors breaks the pessimistic induction from 
their unreliability to a conclusion that we are unreliable. To threaten our rational 
confidence in our particular theories, the pessimist needs much more than he has offered. 
 
 
 
Why worry? 
 
How confident does the history of science allow us to be about our current well-tested 
scientific theories, and why? The scientific realist thinks we are well within our rights to 
believe our best-tested theories, or some aspects of them, are approximately true.1 
Ambitious arguments have been made to this effect, such as that over historical time our 
scientific theories are converging to the truth, that the retention of concepts and claims is 
evidence for this, and that there can be no other serious explanation of the practical 
success of science than that its theories are approximately true. There is appeal in each of 
these ideas, but making such strong claims has tended to be hazardous, leaving us open to 
charges that many typical episodes in the history of science just do not fit the model. 
(See, e.g., Laudan 1981.) Arguing for a realist attitude via general claims -- properties 
ascribed to sets of theories, trends we see in progressions of theories, and claimed links 
between general properties like success and truth that apply or fail to apply to any theory 
regardless of its content – is like arguing for or via a theory of science, which brings with 
it the obligation to defend that theory. I think a realist attitude can be maintained 
rationally and without such a theory, as I will try to explain.  
The starting point at which questions arise as to what in general we have a right to 
believe about our theories is one where we have theories and evidence for them, and we 
are involved in the natural or unreflective activity of apportioning our belief in each in 
                                                 
1 Recent efforts of this sort can be found in Leplin 1997, who argues for a link between novel predictive 
success and truth, and Psillos (1999), who argues for a link between referential continuity and descriptive 
accuracy. 
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accord with the strength of the evidence.2 The devil’s advocate sees our innocence and 
proceeds to do his best to sow seeds of doubt as best he can. If our starting point is as I 
say, though, the innocent believer in particular theories does not have to play offense and 
propose sweeping views about science in general, but only to respond to the skeptic’s 
challenges. The burden of initial argument is on the skeptic. The greatest strength of the 
realist attitude lies at this starting point, as Arthur Fine (1996) realized, and I will argue 
here that the innocent has so far not been given reason to give it up. In particular, no 
pessimistic induction over the history of science has done what it needs to do in order to 
undermine our right to apportion our beliefs in particular theories to the evidence we have 
for them. To show this I am going to reconstruct what the pessimistic inductivist could 
possibly be saying when he tries to undermine our confidence, and show that there is an 
argument form that is potentially threatening, and that the innocent realist has no right to 
ignore. However, this argument form requires much more than anyone has realized if it is 
to serve the pessimist, and the pessimist has not actually ever offered what is needed.  
For an example of how to start from the beginning, consider the realist of the sort 
I described, whom I will ll also call the “optimist,” who is typically confident that 
Quantum Theory has gotten some very big things right. Her confidence in Quantum 
Theory is based on trust in the work of the scientific community, her understanding of the 
good evidence we have for this theory, and her own thought and knowledge about the 
physical world and logical and mathematical matters. There may be circumstances in 
which it would be helpful to her to have a further argument at her disposal that explains 
why all of this speaks to her having a right to her belief about Quantum Theory. But the 
having of a right to a belief does not require her to have an argument available that she 
has a right to this belief. If it did then the justificational regress that follows would 
undermine our right to any of our beliefs.  
If this is where we start then the anti-realist will have to provide reason to believe 
that our innocent does not have a right to such beliefs. One way to do that would be to 
cast doubt on the optimist’s evidence for Quantum Theory, meaning arguing about 
particular experiments and so on, and if those doubts were compelling then she would be 
obligated to take them seriously. Of course, this has not been the strategy of the anti-
realist, whose only other option, then, is to make a general argument for doubt that will 
apply to Quantum Theory qua theory, or qua theory of a particular sort. That is, the 
pessimist will have to find a fault or weakness that can be described without reference to 
the contents of particular theories. If he is to do this by an induction over history, then he 
must draw our realist into reflection about all (many, most, typical, etc.) theories and 
scientists of the past, and show why those reflections are both relevant and damning for 
us. The pessimist’s tools have to be at a general level, but the confidence of the optimist 
that the pessimist would like to undermine is in particular theories, e.g. Quantum Theory, 
so the pessimist needs to give us something if he is to provide a connection. If instead of 
history he is going to invoke general concepts, such as underdetermination of theory by 
                                                 
2 This stance is of course somewhat similar to Arthur Fine’s Natural Ontological Attitude. (Fine 1996)  
However, besides my focusing more on epistemology rather than ontology, there is also the difference that 
here it is a starting point against which, I argue, there is a compelling form of argument for ascent from our 
object-level beliefs to reflection on them, and from there descent to withdrawal of confidence in particular 
theories. It’s just that, as I show below, making that form of argument successful requires much more than 
the anti-realists have offered. 
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evidence, or general trends in the history of science, like getting it wrong by our lights, 
then the anti-realist will have to explain why these things have an upshot for belief in 
Quantum Theory. I don’t say these things cannot be done – sometimes a theory exhibits a 
simple instance of one of these epistemologically relevant concepts, and surely there are 
some similarities between our predecessors and ourselves. I am making the point that this 
is what needs to be done in order to provide a challenge to optimism about the 
approximate truth of any particular theory. You cannot do a legitimate induction from 
properties of swans to properties of bananas. 
In the pessimistic induction over the history of science the relevance of the 
failures of our predecessors is supposed to come by way of likeness. We are like them, 
and since they failed at the project of getting true theories, we have insufficient reason to 
believe that we are succeeding. I will argue that there is only one form of the pessimistic 
induction over the history of science that is a prima facie compelling challenge to the 
hunkered down realist position just described. However, as I explain below, it takes much 
more care than has been recognized to make that argument succeed.  
In particular, I will argue that for the pessimist’s historical evidence base of 
failure to be relevant to us at all, his argument must be formulated as a meta-induction, 
meaning an induction over our beliefs in scientific theories and the properties of our 
beliefs, where these take the position that swans and white respectively do in the 
generalization to “All swans are white.” Similarity at the level of these meta-facts – they 
had beliefs … , we have beliefs … – could be the basis of the induction the pessimist 
desires, but simply because of the way such an induction must work, two more elements 
are also needed: to know why exactly facts about their beliefs are relevant to claims about 
our beliefs – the contents of the beliefs are different after all – and to know why even a 
meta-claim about ourselves, a claim about our having certain beliefs and dispositions to 
believe, should affect our confidence in the matters they are beliefs about. We will see 
that the pessimist must make some quite substantive claims to make all of this work, and 
that so far no pessimist has adequately made the case. It is not clear to me that they can. 
 
 The most obvious first pass at rendering the pessimistic induction is simply to 
say: our predecessor scientists believed theories and those theories were false. We believe 
theories, too. What is the reason to think they are not false? The realist might reply at this 
point that our evidence is better than our predecessors’, but, the pessimist will say, 
though you have better evidence than your predecessors by your lights, they had better 
evidence than their predecessors too, by their lights. Still they were wrong. However, 
drawing the conclusion from this that we are probably wrong presumes either that 
objectively better evidence cannot advance us toward the truth no matter how much 
better it is, or that there is no way for us to judge better and worse evidence objectively, 
that our view about this is merely our view. To presume that even objectively better 
evidence cannot get us conclusions that are more likely to be true is to cite the general 
problem of induction, and if that is the pessimist’s basis then he did not need to cite past 
scientific failure. The second issue of whether we have objectively better evidence, and 
how we could know that, is one I will address below.  
But the optimist needn’t have gone so far as to insist that our evidence is better. 
For though there may be reason to think our theories are false, the fact that our 
predecessors were wrong is not a reason to think our theories are false unless our case is 
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relevantly similar to theirs. If we cite further facts that relevantly distinguish us, then it is 
the pessimist’s burden to say why we are for all relevant purposes the same. This is just 
an instance of a general fact about induction, namely that even if all F so far are G, the 
inference to the claim that the next case with F will be G is rendered illegitimate if the 
next case is known to have a further property which we know is relevant to whether G 
arises. There is such a further fact in this case: our evidence set is simply distinct in 
content from that of the evidence our predecessors’, and the content of evidence claims is 
obviously relevant to whether they support a given theory. If the pessimist simply cites 
the fact that our predecessors had (good) evidence for their beliefs, then there is a 
counter: the content of a set of evidence propositions is relevant to whether the belief one 
might base on them is true. If our evidence set is different from our predecessors’, then it 
remains to be shown why their failure is a reason to believe in ours. The optimist can stop 
here, for it is not now her burden to say why ours is better, but the pessimist’s burden to 
say why it is not.  
 The pessimist might instead try to find the relevance of our predecessors’ 
evidence to our situation by pointing to the specific evidential claims; our evidence set is 
different from theirs, but they overlap over some propositions. This will not work, 
because even particular evidence claims that we may share with our predecessors can be 
relevant to whether our theories are true only if their content is relevant to the content of 
our theories in the right way. Typically it is not. Whatever it was about the facts and the 
phlogiston theory that made scientists give up that theory is not evidence against our 
theory or the parts of that chemical picture that we might have retained. Our theory did 
not retain parts of that theory that we (and the pessimist) thought that evidence had 
falsified, so the evidence that falsified that theory does not falsify our chemical theory.3  
The relevant evidence of our predecessors was supposed to be the evidence they 
had for their theories, one will say. But this fares even worse. Anything we did retain 
from their theory had not been falsified by any of our predecessors’ evidence (or ours), so 
any positive evidence they had for their view is also positive evidence for that part of 
ours. Evidence, always being incomplete, may support more than one theory or falsify 
more than one theory. Thus the positive evidence for their theory may be relevant to our 
theory even if we did not retain their picture. But if that evidence supported our theory, 
how exactly could it give a reason for us to withdraw confidence in our theory? It is not, 
after all, our only evidence. And if it told against our theory we would not be espousing 
our theory, since this is evidence that we knew about in choosing our own theories.4 
                                                 
3 Obviously, I am using a highly idealized picture of how later theories deal with earlier evidence for earlier 
theories (broadly, denying Kuhn loss, and assuming what Feyerabend called the Consistency Condition), 
but this does not presuppose convergence of theories to the truth, because it does not presuppose that there 
is any amount of evidence we could get that is good enough to give us a right to say we are closer to the 
truth than our predecessors.  Respect for the evidence of our predecessors of the kind I’m supposing here is 
compatible with our both being not only quite wrong, but prima facie justified in our belief. Stanford’s 
pessimistic induction, in particular, does not depend on Kuhn loss. See Ch. 1, Stanford (2006).  
4 I am making crude assumptions about falsification. But the pessimist must also be assuming the past 
theories are falsified or his negative evidence from the history of science disappears. And he must be 
assuming that our theories are not falsified or he would not need to make his argument in the first place. 
One can be more subtle about how much negative evidence it takes to be falsified. One counterexample is 
never taken to be enough in real science. But the structure I have described remains, and follows from the 
symmetries and asymmetries the pessimist needs as a basis. 
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This point is even stronger when we consider that the pessimist is trying to make 
an argument over all theories from the past, and his argument sounds better for it. 
Somehow the track record of all theories together speaks against our particular 
confidence in Quantum Theory. However, that general track record over all such theories 
is not relevant to our confidence in each of ours via our predecessors’ particular evidence 
claims, since there is no reason at all to think that the particular evidence against or for 
the theory of bodily humors, or spontaneous generation, etc., that eventually came to 
light, casts doubt on Quantum Theory. None of these cases support the idea that the 
particular evidence that falsified or supported old theories says something negative or 
positive about any particular theory of ours.5 When put this way the point is obvious, and 
it may be for that reason that it has not tended to be remarked upon; we need to draw it 
out here in order to scan all of the pessimist’s possible options. 
The evidence for or against false theories of the past is not relevant to whether we 
have a right to believe our theories insofar as the contents of those evidence-claims are 
not related to the contents of our theories in an appropriate way. I drew this out in detail 
to show that the pessimist is forced to use a meta-induction. For what does strongly 
appear to be relevant to our case is the fact that our predecessors had evidence that 
supported their theories, and that evidence was inadequate to their presumed goal of 
having true theories. The similarity for a potential induction must be between the point of 
view of many previous scientists and the point of view of our own, between how their 
evidence (or beliefs) related to their theories’ truth values and how our evidence (or 
beliefs) relate to our own theories’ truth values. This general feature is the only thing we 
share with our predecessors that is potentially relevant in a pessimistic way, to our right 
to believe in Quantum Theory. The similarity in cases that makes for the basis of a 
pessimistic induction is indeed the property of their being in some sense justified by their 
evidence, and our being in some sense justified by ours. 
This is where the power of the pessimistic induction over the history of science 
lies. As noted, I call it a “meta-induction” because its claims refer not to things in the 
world that scientific theories are about but to our beliefs and evidence about things, and 
our tendencies to believe. In the pessimistic argument are not simply acting in our 
epistemic situation – believing theories on the basis of evidence – but reflecting on that 
activity. The pessimist bases his conclusion on the observation that people like us have 
been rational with their evidence yet come to false theoretical beliefs, and categories with 
no referents, time and again. Thus, what links us to our predecessors is not that what 
falsified or supported their theories T1, T2, …, Tn might falsify our theories Tn+1, Tn+2, …, 
Tm. The similarity that makes the basis for an induction is the more general claim that 
they had good evidence, in some sense of good, just as we do. The property that came 
along with this was being wrong. This is right as far as it goes, and standard pessimist 
have even sounded like this.  
It is not often noticed that this is not enough to make the pessimistic argument go. 
One reason is that our evidence is in many ways different from that of our predecessors, 
beyond the difference in content just discussed, now in general properties. We have more. 
                                                 
5 It would be pointless for the anti-realist to object to the assertion that our theories are not falsified by 
appealing to the Duhemian point that this is so only relative to auxiliary assumptions we must be assuming 
we know. The claim that our predecessors’ theories were false is also relative to auxiliary assumptions, and, 
as noted in the previous footnote, the pessimist needs this claim to get his induction going. 
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It covers more territory. It comes from different experiments. This difference is there 
even if both sets of evidence are good, in some sense, for their times. To do an induction 
we need a similarity there. What is it? Likewise, the property of our predecessors that 
“they were wrong” must be a property we can have too, if the pessimist is to infer that we 
have it. The attribution to our predecessors can’t simply be the statement “-T1 and -T2 . 
… . -Tn” denying their particular theories, because that can’t be a property of our theories 
Tn+1, Tn+2, …, Tm, since the contents are not relevantly the same (see above) and the 
negated contents of our predecessors’ theories is the only content of the property 
described. If an inductive projection is to occur, there must be a property of our 
predecessors that we or our situation can be substituted into as argument, keeping the 
property itself the same. An example would be something general like:  
 
For all n and all theories Tn that were believed by those human beings doing 
science, and unfalsified at the time, PR(-Tn) > .90,  
 
that is, the probability that Tn is false is greater than 90%. If the induction goes through, 
then our property will be  
 
For all n and all theories Tn believed by these human beings doing science, and 
unfalsified at the time, PR(-Tn) >.90.  
 
The number .90 is not special; if there is an important challenge here at all, then any 
number approaching .5 will do. The point is that the pessimist’s argument needs a lot 
more structure, including higher-order structure, if it is to make the past record connect to 
us at all.  
The property in question is a relation between our beliefs and evidence on the one 
hand and the truth of the theory believed on the other, namely the general property of 
fallibility. From there the argument must include at least two steps. The first is to show 
the relevance of the fallibility of our predecessors to our own level of fallibility. Most of 
us will readily admit that we, and even scientists, are fallible. The first claim in the 
pessimist’s induction though, must be that our predecessors’ fallibility is a good reason to 
believe in our own fallibility at a level as significant as theirs. This, I will argue, is 
questionable, and at least has not yet been shown by the pessimists. The second claim the 
pessimist needs is that our fallibility would be a reason to withdraw confidence in our 
particular theories. This claim is widely assumed but in serious need of explanation. I will 
argue that it is true and non-trivial that discoveries about our own fallibility can give us 
reason to withdraw confidence in our object-level beliefs, and I will supply the 
explanation of this below. Of course, as just said, the fact that this type of inference is 
legitimate does not get the pessimist his conclusion without an argument that our 
predecessors’ unreliability is a reason to believe in ours, which is where he has failed. 
In what follows I will proceed in roughly three steps. First, I will formulate more 
explicitly what the steps of the second-order challenge must be which claims, on the basis 
of the history of science, that we have significant fallibility. Then I will explain the 
relevance of such a challenge to our first-order beliefs in our particular theories. Finally, I 
will use these points to show why the pessimist has not yet succeeded in making an 
argument of this form. Since the relevant property in all steps of the argument is the 
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general property of fallibility, formulating the challenge requires first defining this 
concept carefully. 
 
 
 
Fallibility 
 
To define the property of fallibility adequately, we must take into account at least two 
things. One is that the property isn’t trivial; it both has bite, and, as I will argue, is 
something distinct from merely lacking confidence in particular propositions. Two, we 
must be able coherently to attribute it to ourselves and see what its proper relation to our 
other beliefs might be. In this section I will argue that thinking of fallibility as a second-
order property, that refers not just to things but also to our beliefs about things, helps 
enormously with these goals. 
There are already many areas where it would be helpful to have a finer 
formulation of the property of fallibility than we have. A classic example occurs in the 
Preface Paradox. I write a book, and thus assert each of its sentences. It is also natural for 
me to write a preface acknowledging that people are not perfect and that some of my 
conclusions may be, might be, or probably are, wrong. Both of these claims seem natural, 
and they are apparently intuitively coherent. Yet standard ways of expressing these two 
thoughts lead to contradiction. Let us use the following informal expression to see why. 
On the one hand, I assert each of the sentences of my book with high confidence: 
 
p1, p2, p3, …, p10,000 
 
On the other hand I admit my confidence that at least one of those thousands of claims is 
false: 
 
not-p1 or not-p2 or not-p3 or … or not-p10,000  
 
Immediately we see that we have portrayed me as having high confidence in each of an 
inconsistent set of propositions.  
Some have offered solutions that involve denying that conjoining conjuncts 
preserves justification (closure under conjunction). Others propose that the lesson of the 
preface paradox is that it is possible to rationally believe two contradictory claims – the 
conjunction and the disjunction – as long as we avoid conjoining them and believing a 
contradiction. These options have high price tags, and fortunately I do not think we need 
them. The significance of the difference between the list of conjuncts and their 
conjunction is that probabilistically speaking, a high confidence in p1, and high 
confidence in p2, and, …, high confidence in p10,000 do not rationally require me to have a 
high confidence in the conjunction p1 . p2 . p3 . … . p10,000. In fact, as long as the 
confidence in each of the conjuncts is only high rather than maximal, I am rationally 
required to have quite the opposite, a low confidence in the conjunction. For consider, if 
my confidence in each of the pn is 95%, I only need to get to 59 such claims in order for 
the required confidence in the conjunction to drop to 5%. This is because the probability 
of a conjunction is the product of the probabilities of the conjuncts. 95% raised all the 
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way to the 10,000th power, as in this case, makes the probability of the conjunction 
practically nil. It immediately follows that the probability of the negation of this 
conjunction, that is, of the disjunction of the negations of the conjuncts, must be high. My 
degrees of belief in the conjuncts, conjunction, and disjunction must be related according 
to these probabilities if I am to be coherent. Thus, as long as my confidence is not 
maximal, a high degree of confidence in the disjunction of the negation of these 
conjuncts is consistent with a high degree of confidence in each of the conjuncts. Indeed 
the former is required by the latter.  
Resolution of the problem via non-extreme degrees of belief may not have 
seemed promising because on pain of incoherence one might not have expected the 
proportionality to work out right. Since her beliefs in each of the conjuncts collectively 
contradict the disjunction of the negations of the conjuncts the possibility that all have 
high credence may not have leapt to mind. But looking at degrees of belief showed that it 
is obligatory, and this could be seen as the silver lining in the phenomena that make us 
worry about the closure of justification over conjunction.  
But on this picture the probability or rational credence in the conjunction is still 
low, one might object, whereas the prefacer should surely be confident of the 
conjunction. There is no reason to suppose the person writing the preface is confident in 
that conjunction. She came to have reasons to believe any of the conjuncts only by local 
arguments for each, we are imagining. She surely recognizes the logical relation between 
the conjuncts and conjunction, and the logical relation may make her feel she should 
assert the conjunction because of asserting the conjuncts, but her instincts about fallibility 
and the disjunction tell her not to. Discomfort comes from not recognizing why low 
confidence in the conjunction is rational given the rest of her commitments, but via non-
maximal degrees of belief we have just seen the reason for this. For confirmation of this 
intuitive side of the situation notice that if we asked the one who came to confidence in 
each conjunct relatively separately whether she is confident that all of the claims in her 
book are correct (the conjunction), she will surely say: Well, no, probably at least one of 
them is wrong (the disjunction of negations).   
One might object that how confident one is allowed to be in the disjunction of 
negations depends, on this picture, on the number of conjuncts asserted, and must be 
small if there are few conjuncts. Our preface-writer, on the other hand, is surely highly 
confident she has made at least one mistake. The allowed confidence in the disjunction 
does indeed depend on the number of conjuncts on this picture. However, intuitively, the 
prefacer’s level of confidence that she’s made at least one error also depends on how 
many claims she has made. If you had confidently made only three claims, how confident 
would you be that at least one of them is wrong? Surely not very. In that case it would be 
quite strange for the prefacer to express high confidence of error. She may have some 
credence that she has erred somewhere in the three, but the resolution of the problem via 
degrees of belief allows this. The reason that the preface paradox deals with a book isn’t 
just that books have prefaces, but that books are long. 
The other possibility is that my degrees of belief concerning these matters are 
maximal (extreme), 1 or 0. If my confidence in each of the conjuncts is full then 
probabilistic coherence requires my confidence in the conjunction to be perfect(1n = 1), 
and also (thereby) requires zero confidence in the disjunction of negations of the 
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conjuncts.6 This is surely the picture we have when we sense that the person asserting her 
conjuncts and expressing her fallibility is incoherent. Coherence expects her to have zero 
confidence in the disjunction of negations, and she appears to have more than zero, 
apparently significantly more. However, this case is not paradoxical either. A person with 
maximal confidence would have no reason to give credence to those denials, since she 
does not leave open any possibility of being wrong. (The formal expression of this is the 
fact that the maximal degree of belief (1) that is the way we must express her confidence 
if we are to generate paradox, makes impossible any revision of that belief on the basis of 
change in other beliefs.) The person we imagine having perfect confidence that requires 
zero confidence in the negations is not plausibly a person who would have written 
confidently of the possibility of her being wrong in the first place.  
The paradox of the preface does not arise merely from the fact that p1, p2, p3, …, 
p10,000 are together incompatible with not-p1 or not-p2 or not-p3 or … or not-p10,000 . We 
also need to have reason to suppose that those propositions (or other appropriately 
contradictory relatives of them) are ones that the writer of the imagined, apparently 
reasonable, preface is asserting. We just saw that we can suppose the writer of the preface 
has very high confidence in each of the conjuncts – as high as you like though not 1 – 
with significant credence for the disjunction of their negations, and no incoherence. And 
though there is a type of subject who should not give any credence to the negations, for 
coherence reasons this can only be a subject who is maximally confident in the conjuncts. 
Such a person has no doubt about those conjuncts, from any source, so we would not 
expect her to have written the self-doubting preface anyway.   
The application of this discussion to the issue of realism is that we have just 
shown it is possible to acknowledge a high probability of error somewhere in your 
beliefs, maintain high confidence in particular beliefs, and remain perfectly rational. 
Concerning ourselves with maximal degrees of belief had led us astray here.7 So, we can 
have high confidence that some of our theoretical claims are wrong, while coherently 
maintaining high confidence in each. Acknowledging that we err, does not require 
pessimism. This is another expression of the fact that the pessimist cannot win at the first 
order but must deal with claims about beliefs and theories.  
There is a richer way of representing the claim of fallibility which gives the 
pessimist another chance. It is of course not impossible for a maximally confident person 
to write the self-doubting preface. If we express fallibility in a more adequate way than 
we have so far, we will see that it is not even first-order probabilistically incoherent for 
the maximally confident person to write that preface. There is a broader irrationality 
involved in it though, that corresponds to our expectation that a person would not feel 
inclined to do that. The formulation of fallibility above implicitly took my expression of 
my fallibility about the topic of my book as itself in direct competition with my 
confidence in each of the propositions in question, equating my recognition of my 
                                                 
6 Thus, a perfect level of justification is closed under conjunction. What is not closed under conjunction is 
rational degree of belief. The failure to distinguish these two facts and the intuitions that correspond to 
them, causes much confusion about these kinds of cases. 
7 Philip Kitcher (2001a, 2001b) first invoked the preface paradox and the fact that the book-author’s 
assertions are intuitively coherent to argue that fallibility of science is not a reason to doubt our theories. I 
am effectively fleshing out that point by explaining why the book-author’s assertions are coherent. 
However, my arguments also show why this coherence does not mean the scientific realist is automatically 
off the hook, since we can formulate fallibility in another way.  
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fallibility with a lack of perfect confidence that all of those propositions were true. This is 
one way to understand the problem, and it generates the most direct version of it that we 
just dealt with. However, what I am asserting when I say with high (not maximal) 
confidence: 
 
not-p1 or not-p2 or not-p3 or … or not-p10,000  
 
is not giving me or my audience any more information over my lack of perfect 
confidence that: 
 
p1 and p2 and p3 and, …, and p10,000 
 
(except the fact that with regard to these degrees of belief I am coherent and responsive to 
the relation between the contents of these propositions). My high, or at least non-zero, 
confidence in the disjunction of the negations of the conjuncts is not a statement of my 
fallibility. It is simply an expression of my confidence about particular matters.8 
 When one discovers that he is sometimes wrong about such things, what he 
discovers is unfortunate, his discovering it is fortunate, but neither is just the same thing 
as his lacking confidence in the particular propositions. Rather, it says he has a general 
property, a tendency among his beliefs; it is a statement about his beliefs, a statement 
which would include among its terms not only “p” but also “B(p),” meaning the subject 
believes b; as such, a statement of my own fallibility is second-order, expressing a belief 
about my beliefs. This way of thinking about fallibility avoids the preface paradox too, in 
that a second-order claim holds no threat of failing to cohere in the strict sense with first-
order claims like the p’s above (not without further assumptions).9 However, intuitively, 
believing ourselves fallible surely places some kind of rational demands on us in our 
management of our first-order beliefs. It is a general issue exactly what those demands 
are, and it is a question the pessimistic inducer needs an answer to if his arguments that 
we are not generally reliable are to have any punch for our beliefs in Quantum Theory. 
Here I will do the pessimist the favor of filling in this blank in his argument by defining 
fallibility as a second-order property, and explaining why and how it places rationality 
constraints on first-order beliefs.   
If I am asserting a claim of my fallibility in the preface, I am not expressing a low 
confidence in the collective set of claims – although it seems I should have that too – but 
expressing something about my beliefs. I am not withdrawing confidence in them but 
                                                 
8 This is also one problem that afflicts Andy Egan and Adam Elga’s (2007) argument that one can’t 
coherently believe one is unreliable without withdrawing the beliefs in question. There fallibility of a given 
degree has simply been formulated as with the original Preface Paradox here, as the disjunction of the 
negations of the propositions I believe, which automatically cancels that same degree of confidence in the 
claims in question. The 2nd-order formulation of fallibility I give and the solution I just provide two 
independent resolutions of their problem.  
9 In particular, with the second-order way of expressing fallibility it will turn out to be conceptually 
possible to have both maximal confidence in p and recognition of one’s fallibility. This may seem 
paradoxical given my claim above that we wouldn’t expect someone to have these two states together. But 
though on my view it turns out to be conceptually possible, and first-order coherent, this state is not rational 
– you should revise your confidence when you recognize your reliability does not match it – so the preface 
writer we regard as making sense is not best imagined as in this mixed state. 
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making an observation about the probability that creatures like me, using methods like 
this, get it right about matters like this. The claim that p and the claim that I or those like 
me have a general tendency to imperfect beliefs on p-like matters, are distinct kinds of 
assertion.  
 It is reasonable to think that fallibility is a second-order property, and it seems 
clear to me that it is an inverse of reliability, which is also a second-order property. We 
can say that a person’s belief-forming process is x% reliable when: 
 
PR(q/B(q)) = x10 
 
That is, the (objective) probability that it is true, given that the subject has full belief in it 
is x, where for simplicity we are taking “B(p)” to mean perfect confidence.11 For the 
moment we may think of this probability as a rate of success, representing how often p is 
true when the subject believes it. Obviously, the probability that a person is right about q 
when she has perfect confidence in it is not necessarily 1; confidence does not imply 
reliability.  
From this definition of reliability, fallibility can then be expressed as the size of 
the gap between her reliability and perfect reliability. Perfect reliability means the rate, 
PR(q/B(q)), equals 1. Always, when she is sure of it, it is true. Thus, she is fallible (in her 
full beliefs) to degree y when: 
 
1 - PR(q/B(q)) = y 
 
To acknowledge one’s fallibility is to acknowledge that y > 0, and that PR(q/B(q)) = 1 - 
y. That is, it requires a degree of belief in a statement about the objective conditional 
probability PR(q/B(q)). But without further assumptions this belief about this conditional 
probability does not constrain one’s belief about q in any way. This is the most precise 
way of saying why there is no preface paradox. When we say we might be wrong 
somewhere, we mean this second-order claim which does not immediately conflict with 
our first-order beliefs. To make a connection we would need to make an assumption 
about how a degree of belief about a property of our degree of belief in q should relate to 
degrees of belief in q. Probabilistic coherence alone – conforming one’s degrees of belief 
to the probability calculus, does not by itself give a constraint concerning that connection.  
To admit that you are fallible about q is not eo ipso to withdraw belief in q.  
Similarly for partial belief, to admit that your reliability level about q when believing it to 
some specific degree is x is not eo ipso to reduce or increase your degree of belief in q. 
Admitting your fallibility may be a reason to reduce your degree of belief in q, but it is 
not the same thing, and if it is a reason we will have to say why. 
 
 
Non Sequitur 
                                                 
10 This is not the only way to express reliability, and hence fallibility, though I think that any adequate way 
of expressing it must be second-order, not first-order.  
11 One might be worried about the lower end of the spectrum of degrees between 0 and 1. What could it 
mean to say that someone was 20% reliable? It means, simply, that they get it right 20% of the time. They 
wouldn’t be a very useful source (except in reverse, in a yes-no query), but that isn’t the problem here. 
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We now see how to express admission of fallibility in a way that is consistent with first-
order assertion of particular claims, so that the admission is not eo ipso a withdrawal of 
confidence. But is it not clear that the admission still undermines our justification for the 
first-order belief by an obvious and immediate inference? Wouldn’t our serious fallibility 
as scientists, if shown, automatically give reason for an equally serious reduction of our 
confidence in Quantum Theory? 
Consider one consequence if we did think that the admission of fallibility 
immediately undermines our justifications for first-order beliefs, even domain-
specifically. Most of us will have been frustrated at least once in our lives by a typical 
Creationist (or Intelligent-Designist) line of rhetoric one hears, which points out that the 
theory of evolution has not been proved. Therefore, it is concluded, opposing views 
(especially one in particular) have a right to be taught in public schools. We should have 
an “open mind,” and not be so confident in the views of the scientific mainstream that we 
shove them down students’ throats. It certainly looks like the Creationist is appealing to 
the fallibility of science in this argument. One obvious reply to this is that he is mistaking 
a small quantity of fallibility for a problem so large that it puts all views and frameworks 
on an equal footing of plausibility. “Proof” is for mathematics and logic, not for empirical 
research where fallibility is just the way it is. But if the level of fallibility is significant, 
then what? The resemblance of the form of the pessimistic induction over the history of 
science to this Creationist rhetoric is somewhat alarming. In charity we must suppose 
there is a difference, but it would be nice to know what it is. We will see below that when 
we understand what has potential in the pessimist’s argument – by understanding the 
rational place of fallibility claims – we will also see what is fallacious about the 
Creationist argument.  
 The first problem is a group of quantitative issues. Judging intuitively, the 
admission that we are not perfectly reliable should not produce a leveling in the 
credibility of all theories, though we have yet to say exactly why. The pessimistic 
argument is most compelling if we convince ourselves that our predecessors were often 
or always wrong, meaning they had a low, or very low, reliability. But how should we 
count? What if there are more theories in the last 100 years than in the previous 5,000, 
and whereas all of the previous ones were false (or at least abandoned) a high percentage 
of those in the last 100 years are still not falsified (and are retained)? All of these folks 
are our predecessors and the overall numbers aren’t yet shown to be bad. Nevertheless, 
suppose we can argue for a high unreliability of our predecessors. It’s clear we share with 
them a lack of perfect reliability, but why think we share with them a quantitatively large 
impairment? 
 I will return to this question below. But suppose we can find a reason to think that 
large impairment is shared. Another pressing problem, just described above, is why even 
if we successfully attribute a surprising, significant, general level of unreliability to 
ourselves, this should issue in a withdrawal of our confidence in specific first-order 
matters, such as particular claims of the Special Theory of Relativity. Suppose that q = 
The speed of light is not different in different frames of reference, where frame of 
reference is defined by velocity. The claims that are probabilistically relevant to that 
claim are the results of the Michelson-Morley experiment, the claim that the 
interferometer arms were equal in length, and so on. The first is relevant because if the 
 12
experimental apparatus works as it should then the fact that no interference fringes show 
up in the experiment raises the probability that the speed of light is constant over 
reference frames. The second is relevant because length equality in the interferometer 
arms increases the probability that the apparatus works as it should, i.e., that fringes you 
may see are due to variation in the speed of light. Length equality is relevant to the 
hypothesis because it raises the probability of that hypothesis given the experimental 
outcome. Our being fallible is definitely not relevant to the Special Theory of Relativity 
in the way that typical evidence like this is.12   
As pointed out above, it is a straightforward fact that the general level of 
unreliability we might attribute to ourselves, 
 
PR(q/B(q)) = x, 
 
is not probabilistically relevant to 
 
q 
 
and thus not to how much confidence we should have in q, without further assumptions. 
PR(q/B(q)) is related to PR(B(q)) via: 
 
PR(q/B(q)) = PR(q . B(q))/ PR(B(q)) 
 
But the question is what confidence we should have in q, given our credence for 
PR(q/B(q)) = x, not what confidence we should have in B(q) in that circumstance. How 
confident should I be in q if I believe that the probability that q is true given that I believe 
it is x? How my degrees of belief about these matters should affect my degree of belief in 
q is so far an open question. 
  Failure to respond to a change in my confidence in my reliability level PR(q/B(q)) 
with a change in confidence in q does not make me (1st-order) probabilistically 
incoherent. It is the burden of the argument the pessimist needs to be making to say what 
the extra assumptions or rationality constraints are that make the fallibility claim relevant 
to our first-order beliefs. Otherwise the track record of our predecessors has not given us 
a reason to withdraw confidence in our theories, even if it gives us reason to doubt our 
reliability, even significantly.  
 
Descent 
 
I will call this the problem of “descent” because we have to say why and how a second-
order discovery about our tendency to believe should affect our confidence in specific 
                                                 
12 One might notice that the second claim is the denial of a Type II defeater—a claim not that the purported 
evidence claims are false but that the purported support relation between the evidence and the hypothesis is 
weaker than thought. And one may wonder whether we don’t need something greater than first-order 
probabilistic relevance to model that relevance. But first-order relevance accounts for Type II defeaters 
handily.  C is a Type II defeater of the claim that A supports B iff Pr(B/A) > Pr(B/A.C). A Type II defeater 
screens off the relevance of A to B. The relevance of all the specific claims to the hypothesis that the speed 
of light is constant over reference frames can be represented as first-order probabilistic coherence. The 
relevance of claims about fallibility cannot.  
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first-order claims. Surely a discovery that, say, we fall into a class of people who have a 
20% error rate on theoretical claims doesn’t mean we need to drop our confidence in the 
relativity of simultaneity to 50-50, meaning that all bets are off. But it is reasonable to 
think it means something. 
 A notion that would give the pessimist’s intentions their due is that of calibration: 
we are calibrated when we match our confidence to our accuracy. We can see an example 
of the concept of calibration in the way that an eyewitness’s confidence on the witness 
stand relates or should relate to his other properties. We onlookers may have no 
information about the person’s track record in making face recognition judgments, but 
there is a track record and it appears to be epistemically good, in some sense, if the 
witness is no more confident in his judgment now than the percentage of times he’s 
gotten such judgments right in the past. His track record is a clue to how reliable he is. If 
he’s been right 99% of the time it would be epistemically good if he were very highly 
confident. (Otherwise in trusting him only to his level of confidence we are deprived of 
the information he likely has.) At the other end of the spectrum, if he were right 50% of 
the time in past such cases, we hope that he would say “I don’t know.” He may have no 
inkling of his bad track record—he may have acquired amnesia since his last such 
judgment—and if we don’t know about the amnesia or the track record we are out of 
luck. It is clear what would be most epistemically sound and helpful in these situations, 
from imagining it present and imagining it absent. 
 There is psychological evidence that jurors use confidence of a witness as an 
indication of accuracy by default, effectively assuming calibration without any 
information pertinent to the property. That is, on first encounter with a witness, a juror 
tends to believe what a confident witness says in direct proportion to the witness’s 
confidence. Since confidence implies nothing without calibration, this appears to be an 
epistemic disaster for the system of trial by jury, and was greeted as such on its 
discovery. This illustrates both that calibration is a non-trivial property, i.e., that 
confidence and accuracy are distinct properties that do not necessarily line up in naturally 
occurring beliefs, and that it matters to us; it would be good for us if a witness’s 
testimony were calibrated before we form any particular degree of confidence in what he 
says, even if, as a matter of fact, we tend to be poor judges of calibration. Incidentally, 
and in keeping with the idea that we do demand calibration, it has recently been 
discovered that (mock) jurors do make use of any further evidence of error by that 
witness that comes available, to reduce their judgment of his calibration and thereby of 
his credibility when he is confident. (Tenney et al. 2007) The jurors’ default assumption 
of calibration is defeasible. 
 So, suppose calibration – having your confidence match your accuracy – is a good 
thing, and that by “accuracy” we mean reliability, probability of being right, the property 
defined above that we can get information about by looking at track record. This would 
imply that our confidence in our particular theories should match our reliability in 
making such judgments, and that if we aspire to that then our confidence should match 
what we believe our reliability is.13 We have hereby uncovered the basis of an intuition 
                                                 
13 This obligation can be formulated as a rule for updating our beliefs on discovery of information about our 
reliability level, so: Prf(q) = Pri(q/[Pri(q) = x . PR(q/Pri(q) = x) = y]) = y. That is, the final degree of belief 
you ought to have in q given that your current degree of belief in q is x and that you think the objective 
probability of q when you believe q to degree x is y, is y. So, for example, if you know that in the past 
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that makes us feel a pull from the pessimistic induction: if the pessimist can show us that 
the (supposed) low reliability of our predecessors is good evidence that we have a low 
reliability, then we should reduce our confidence in our particular theories to the level of 
reliability we have now come to believe we have. If we believe our reliability level as 
scientists is 50%, then we should be no more confident than not that our theories are true. 
Our beliefs about our own reliability/fallibility in p-like matters are after all relevant to 
what our confidence in p should be, in both a coherent and a significant way. Thus, we 
can see how the pessimist can finish his argument on us, if he manages to convince us we 
are unreliable. But this is the only good news for the pessimist. In what follows I will 
discuss how the historical evidence the pessimist gives us could be a reason to believe we 
are unreliable, but argue that it is not.  
 Note that this way of viewing the relevance of the second-order property of 
fallibility to what our first-order confidence in particular theories should be does not 
license the Creationist move. This is because the rule I have described does not imply that 
fallibility implies equal plausibility of all theories. The fallibility will, speaking in 
idealization, be a given number, the reliability being 1 minus that number. Suppose, for 
illustration, that the fallibility level of contemporary science is 20%; then the reliability 
level is 80%. The rule says match your confidence to your reliability, so in this case our 
confidence should be 80%. Discoveries about your reliability level in q-like matters may 
obligate you to push your confidence in q up or down by a small or large amount, but 
they do not automatically mandate, or even license, a leveling in which every view is as 
good as every other. This view also shows why the amount of fallibility matters – our 
allowable confidence varies with it in a way that conforms to the fact that .02 fallibility is 
quite a bit better than .3 and almost as good as 0 (perfect). 
  
 
What have they to do with us? 
 
Suppose our predecessors had low reliability, meaning that they had a pretty high rate of 
believing things that were false. If our reliability level is the same as theirs then, because 
we should be calibrated, we should have low confidence in our theories. The question is 
whether our reliability level is the same or similar, and whether theirs being low is a 
reason to think ours is so. If I have been right above, then this is the best way of seeing 
the issue at stake in the pessimistic induction. The relevant question is not whether their 
theories were false and whether that should matter to us – as we saw above the pessimist 
can’t get where he wants to go that way. Rather the question is whether their ways of 
getting to their beliefs were reliable and whether that should matter to us. In what remains 
I will provide a few substantive arguments, and indications of further similar 
investigations one might do, and I will provide some thoughts about how the optimist-
                                                                                                                                                 
when you responded to the weatherman saying there was a 30% chance of rain on a given day by having a 
30% confidence in rain that day, it actually rained 60% of the days, then you should update today’s 
weatherman-induced 30% confidence in rain to 60%. This scheme is an extension of the Bayesian 
constraints on rationality, that relaxes certain idealizations in order to accommodate the fact that while it is 
unfortunate to discover you are less reliable than you expected, the only irrationality would be to fail to 
respond to that discovery. I am currently developing the details of this rationality constraint. Defense of a 
formal constraint is a very complicated matter, but my ground for endorsing calibration here is the 
empirical evidence that it is beneficial. 
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pessimist dispute ends up, depending on the outcomes of such investigations. I will 
conclude that generally speaking the optimist is not currently threatened. 
One might wonder how we could investigate our reliability level without already 
knowing whether our theories are true. To see our reliability rate we would need to do a 
count among the theories we believe, and see how many are true. But theories that we 
know are false we no longer believe, and asserting the truth of any or all of the ones we 
believe would seem to be begging the question here. If there exists any discernible track 
record for us, must it not be in the broad sense of “us,” the set of human beings doing 
science, in which case, assuming the quantities above work out in favor of the pessimist, 
it is dominated by that very (supposed) faulty record of our predecessors? It seems the 
pessimist wins after all. 
What this misses is that the thing we need an estimate of is not track record per se 
but reliability. Tallying a track record is one way of estimating reliability but it is not the 
only way. For example, we can reasonably judge a machine to be reliable at doing its job 
through knowledge of its mechanism, or we can justifiably judge it as more reliable than 
another machine via our knowledge of the two mechanisms and of how good such 
mechanisms could possibly be at delivering the result we want. Another kind of painfully 
simple example to make the point: we know the valences of Hydrogen and Carbon. Say 
we know the valence needed at the active site of any enzyme that is going to catalyze a 
chemical reaction we want to know how to produce. Suppose Carbon has that valence 
and Hydrogen does not. A given molecule with a Carbon sidechain may not work, but we 
can see that its chance of doing so is fantastically higher than that of a molecule with only 
Hydrogen sidechains. 
We see an analogous thing in comparing our science to that of our predecessors, if 
we think of methods as mechanisms for leading us to believe the truth and avoid 
falsehood.14 Over historical time, our reliability is potentially and probably different from 
that of our predecessors because we use different methods. Here I use the term “method” 
broadly, so that it includes, for example, techniques that do not take the form of rules, and 
also includes techniques that are specific to a given subject matter. The greater the 
historical time between us and them, the greater the probable difference in methods 
between us and our predecessors. There is something to the stereotype that the Ancients 
preferred speculation to observation, and that speculation combined with observation is 
better than speculation alone. There is something right about the idea that Bacon’s 
interventional experimental method, and his rules for safeguarding against psychological 
prejudices, get us more information than mere casual observation, at least, if any method 
gets us anything at all. There is something to the idea that following the refinements of 
experimental methods like those described by John Stuart Mill and William Jevons gives 
us more accurate and safer beliefs. The 20th century brought a massive number of 
discoveries and refinements in statistical methods, and the new century has brought some 
further ones already. Prima facie it looks pretty good for a claim that in reliability we are 
not as bad off as our predecessors. 
                                                 
14 Kitcher’s (2000b) argument that scientists use what he calls the Galilean Strategy of generalizing the 
everyday inference from success to truth aims to establish the legitimacy of using an assumption that the 
two very general properties, success and truth, are linked. But he has moved from discussion of historical 
matching between instantiations of the properties, to examining the legitimacy of what we could call a 
“method” that he thinks scientists use for relating the two.     
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Consider some examples of methods, e.g., simple induction and counterinduction. 
We may be able to show that induction brings us truths in the long run if any method (e.g. 
counterinduction) does. (Reichenbach 1949, Salmon 1967) We may be able to show that 
the straight rule of induction is faster than any other method of ampliative inference. 
(Juhl 1994) But it does not seem that we can show flatly that induction is likely, or even 
more likely than counterinduction, to bring us true beliefs. It may be that neither is 
getting onto the world. However, if the pessimist is going to hang his case on the fact that 
every scientific enterprise faces the problem of induction generally, he could have left off 
his induction over the history of science. We can show that problem through one toy 
case. Moreover, the pessimist usually does want to admit that science gets us some more 
restricted kind of knowledge than that of theories, since otherwise he is the reviled 
“radical philosophical skeptic.” Hanging his case on the basic problem of induction 
would force the pessimist to conclude that justified ampliative inference is impossible, 
and the scientific enterprise is pointless. He would also, incidentally, undermine his own 
inductive argument. 
Let us assume that the world is susceptible to inductive procedures. I will argue 
that some methods are more reliable than others – where reliability is as defined above, 
the probability that q is true given that one has come to believe it by that method. In 
particular, some of the methods we use are more reliable than any of the methods our 
predecessors used. To show that a method is more reliable than another method, it is 
sufficient to show that there are potential errors that the first method is more likely to 
catch than the second method is, and that the there are not errors that the second method 
is more likely to catch than the first method is. If this is to be sufficient for defending 
ourselves against the foibles of our predecessors, we must assume that the application of 
the first method is just as competent as the application of the second. However, the 
pessimist hasn’t shown that our application of method to the world is worse than that of 
our predecessors, so we are free to make this assumption.  
First let us consider methods pairwise on a question about a connection between 
two properties, F and G. We could construe the question as whether the one causes the 
other, or simply whether the correlation will continue as we look at more cases with F. 
We will apply both methods to a finite data set in which every case with property F also 
has property G. Now consider induction by generalization. This simple rule says that if 
all the cases you have seen having property F have property G too, then infer the 
generalization All F-cases have G.  This rule is subject to a simple kind of error, 
illustrated long ago by Bertrand Russell in the example of a man who’s just jumped out 
the top floor of a 60 story building. As he passes the 40th floor, he says “So far, so good.” 
Or consider the chicken who on waking every morning is greeted and fed by the farmer. 
One morning things change dramatically and the chicken loses his head. In both cases 
there is information we know that makes the inference or expectation invalid. It is not 
merely that the conclusion was false, but that adding to the premises makes the inference 
unwarranted.  
It is hard to imagine a human being so uninformed about the world that he doesn’t 
know independently of his jump that the sequence of correlations he is seeing must 
shortly come to an end. But to get himself to a warranted belief about whether or not he 
will go splat, it is not enough to know this; he must also use the information. The method 
he used did not tell him to do that. Another rule added to it would, namely, what 
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Reichenbach called “cross induction.” (Reichenbach 1949, 430) This is the use of any 
information you have that is the basis for another induction that cuts across the trend you 
see and shows that it cannot, or cannot be expected to, continue. The man’s counterpart 
who looks for cross inductions is more likely to come to a true belief about what would 
happen when he jumped than the man who uses only simple induction, because the first 
man has used inductions about falling objects: they always stop at the earth’s surface, and 
the longer they fall the higher the impact, etc. This strongly suggests that the jumper’s 
falling experience will very quickly cease to be so pleasant. 
The error that cross induction guards against is precisely one that would reduce 
our reliability in the sense defined above, for it would be a case of the thing you believe 
(that your fall is not dangerous) being false. The point here generalizes since any 
induction is subject to potential cross inductions due to the non-monotonicity of 
ampliative evidential support; unlike a deductive inference, an inductive inference is 
erodable by addition of premises. It does not seem that there can be potential errors of the 
method of induction plus cross induction that are caught by the method of induction 
alone, since the former method incorporates the latter, and the interaction between the 
two parts of the former method does not seem to create new error possibilities. It is true 
that any cross-induction is also susceptible to undermining by further evidence, but that is 
a new error whose discovery will require that we find a new cross-induction against the 
original cross-induction. Induction with cross-induction is more reliable than induction 
alone. Moreover, the idea that this is so only by our own lights has a hollow ring.   
A contemporary Bayesian approach to method incorporates this rule in the 
following way. An idealized agent’s beliefs are represented as a total function from all 
the propositions of a language to numbers between zero and one that represent strength of 
belief, that is, as a total probability function. This means that this ideal agent has degrees 
of belief about all matters, and most importantly here, that all the beliefs that any agent 
actually has are expected to be taken into account in any application of any rule that falls 
out of the probability axioms. The probability calculus incorporates a general, rigorous 
version of the cross-induction rule, and it brings more. Abiding by it allows us to expose 
equivalence relationships between different formulations of the same and related 
information, thus helping to identify cross-inductions we might have otherwise missed. 
The quantitative aspect of the Bayesian approach yields rules for weighing how far a 
cross induction undermines an induction. In the case of the flying man the undermining is 
complete. Not so in many other cases. In coming to a conclusion in such cases, we are 
better off if we can tell whether the first induction or the cross induction is more 
powerful, and this approach provides ways of doing that. This is only to mention some 
specific features of Bayesian method that are relevant to the execution of cross 
inductions. Advantages of further features and methods would take several books to 
describe, but we don’t need to consider those to make the point that it is possible to argue 
that some methods are more reliable than others, and in particular that some of our 
methods are better than some, and in some cases any, of those of our predecessors.  
Another problem with simple induction noticed probably first by Francis Bacon, 
and dealt with increasingly rigorously and expansively by John Stuart Mill, Charles 
Sanders Peirce, Neyman and Pearson, Sir Ronald Fisher, and many others who have 
followed, is that in the investigation of how potent an observed association between F 
and G is, one must deal with the possibility that the effect G was brought about by 
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something other than F that one was not aware of. This is now addressed through an 
enormous and growing list of techniques: methods for insuring a representative sample of 
F’s, the setup of a control group that doesn’t have F in order to see whether F was really 
what made the difference to G’s presence, the randomization of the control group to 
attempt to insure that variables other than F are not causing any correlation seen.15 And 
the foregoing are primitive descriptions of old techniques for squeezing information out 
of experiment and observation, that have been enriched and supplemented in the last fifty 
years by entire fields of researchers, in Departments of Statistics for example, and even 
among philosophers and computer scientists in the case, for example, of causal net 
programming. 16 
Another kind of advance has come from various methods that enable the handling 
of more data. It is hard to overestimate, for example, the advances from the inception of 
the computer to its latest sophistications. In the beginning, when the computer was 
invented, the Allies would never have cracked the Germans’ secret code Enigma had they 
not had a computational device that could check thousands of possibilities in real time, 
since Enigma’s translation manual changed every day. A lot of the use of computers, 
even today, is for scanning of a possibility space to discover points that have desirable 
properties. That discovery feature of computing is relevant to our reliability issue here. 
The Allies had to have beliefs every day that some routes, areas, ships, etc., were safe, 
since otherwise they could have had no offensive operations. Cracking Enigma meant 
that they were able to succeed at a higher rate of finding certain areas clear when they 
believed they were, that is, that they were more reliable. 
Again, this is a thoroughly primitive example compared to more recent advances. 
Today’s computing is not only faster but has techniques that predecessors didn’t imagine. 
At any given time, then, we have more evidence, and more and better techniques for 
squeezing it, and an ability to do that faster, than our predecessors’ did. One might object 
that this computing progress has not yet been shown to be relevant because I haven’t 
given a reason to think that more evidence makes our conclusions more reliable. But that 
objection rests on the basic problem of induction. As pointed out above, if the pessimist 
about scientific theories rests his case on that, then he didn’t need to beat around the bush 
with the talk about the history of science. 
 
 
More is all we need 
 
More, and more specific, investigation is needed along these lines of comparing methods 
over the history of science if we are to see in detail where we stand, and this, I submit, is 
where the discussion of realism and anti-realism about our scientific theories is best 
pursued. At a gross level we know that our predecessors were not using certain methods 
before a certain point because those methods did not exist at that time. But there are 
many questions about what they actually were doing in each case, and how it compares to 
what we do for those same topics or related ones. Even if better methods are available 
                                                 
15 Bayesians do not believe that the procedure of randomization gives an advantage over simply insuring 
the matching of traits, but both have sophisticated methods for control. 
16 The reader is advised to look up “Design of Experiment” in Wikipedia to see a sampling of the 
techniques, and that article will be superficial and out of date. 
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today, are they being used, and used well? And is our confidence actually tailored to their 
reliability? And even if better general methods are available today they may, for 
substantive reasons, have no added reliability value for a given topic of investigation. In 
such a case the calibration imperative would counsel no more confidence in our 
conclusions than we think our predecessors had a right to. With advances in methods we 
also know that there can be trade-offs in applying them to any given case. We can be 
forced to lose or forego certain kinds of information when we use a method that enhances 
our ability to get other kinds. (MacCoun 1998) There is a lot more to say at the general 
level too, expanding on the primitive comparisons I have made above. However, though 
an expansion of that might help to identify and describe methods from the past, and to 
judge their reliability levels, the general comparison of methods won’t be nearly as 
informative in the decision how confident to be in our beliefs in our specific theories, as 
it will be when combined with investigation of the particular methods used in the history 
of research those particular theories emerged from. 
 The effort to be calibrated requires that we tailor our confidence in our specific 
contemporary theories to our reliability in coming to espouse them. Methods may have 
changed generally for the better over historical time, but unless they have changed in the 
right way between a theory we currently espouse and its immediate predecessor that we 
regard as falsified, we appear to be vulnerable to the pessimist’s argument. Thus we 
might wonder about the Special Theory of Relativity. We think that its predecessor, 
Newton’s theory, is strictly speaking wrong. But if no new methods were used in the 
Michelson-Morley experiment that tested for variation in the speed of light over reference 
frames than had been used in previous belief-formation about the speed of light, then the 
pessimist could argue that our reliability level can be no better than our frequently failing 
predecessors, and thus via the calibration imperative that we should reduce our 
confidence in Special Relativity.  
What the relevant methods were and whether the ones supporting the constancy of 
the speed of light were better, are questions that the pessimist should, and needs to, take 
up if he means to undermine our confidence in the constancy of the speed of light, one of 
the building blocks of Special Relativity. This is because the investigations of the long 
past and the recent past are prima facie different. In fact, I think we are on quite good 
ground even with the Michelson-Morley experiment itself, though it was only the 
beginning of an increasingly rigorous series of experiments, because that the speed of 
light was different over reference frames was not so much investigated differently in a 
direct way but assumed largely for reasons of theoretical coherence by those who came 
before Michelson, Morley, and their immediate predecessors. The method of assumption 
seems to be less reliable than the method of experimentation, unless we step into the 
night of inductive skepticism in which all cows are black.  
 What if we cannot determine the reliability level of our methods? The task looks 
more difficult the more subject-specific the method under consideration is, since usually 
one would need already to know or make assumptions about the subject to know whether 
such a method is any good. (Although if we cannot make any such assumptions, we are 
back to the basic problem of induction.) A priori arguments like those given above about 
general method will not be quite as easy to find here. Does it not follow that our right to 
our confidence is questionable? There are several reasons why this isn’t a problem. One 
is, as explained, the burden is on the pessimist to show our methods are no better than 
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those of our predecessors. Another is simply that what matters here is the comparison to 
our predecessors, not the absolute level of our reliability, for the question is whether their 
reliability problems are problems for us. Moreover, although I have just offered 
arguments to the effect that some of our methods are more reliable than those of our 
predecessors, the optimist has no obligation to show that much. We have a cross-
induction against the pessimistic induction over the history of science if we find that our 
methods are merely relevantly different. It is the pessimist’s burden to show that despite 
that difference our methods nevertheless have the same (un)reliability. The optimist, it 
seems to me, is in pretty good shape. 
 The pessimist may reasonably protest that even if we show our methods to be 
different from our predecessors’, many of our predecessors also had methods that were 
different from their predecessors’. A lot of good it did them since they ended up wrong a 
lot of the time. This won’t be enough to revive our naysayer’s argument, though. The 
argument of the last paragraph provides us with a cross induction, whose premises are 
true even when we take this latest pessimistic induction into account. The fact that our 
predecessors often had different methods from their predecessors breaks the induction 
over their predecessors to them. So the fact that they had different methods means they 
were not subject to a negative induction. So too for us, by the only induction that is left to 
make. This may also be why we tend to think of those of our predecessors who used 
methods that are a subset of ours as being in some real sense justified even when we also 
think their conclusions were wrong. 
 One may grant that this is all well and good for hypotheses about which 
associations between observations will continue, but it can say nothing about our right to 
be confident in our theories, for their claims go beyond observations. Most people have 
long ago rejected the theory-observation distinction, or at least its epistemological 
relevance, but there are further replies to this line of skepticism even if we grant the 
distinction. For in any case it is the skeptic’s and not the optimist’s burden to say why 
theories pose a particular problem in principle that hypotheses about the continuation of 
observable correlations do not. My own view is that we have not gotten very far in our 
right to have confidence that our most general theories are true (though we have gotten 
beyond observables) but this is not a matter of principle or because their claims go 
beyond observables, or because of a pessimistic induction over history. (Roush 2005, 
Chapter 6) It is what seems most plausible in light of investigation of what is required for 
evidence, what our methods for achieving it are as a matter of fact, and what they have so 
far been able to do.  
No one has I believe argued successfully that we can never find methods that 
improve that situation. The most the pessimist philosopher has usually offered here is 
claims – largely based on general empiricist assumptions -- that no observational 
difference can show a theoretical difference. I have argued (Roush 2005, Chapter 6) on 
the basis of general principles of probability that the line that has been based on this idea 
can be sustained only if we also give up on claims that we have evidential support for 
hypotheses about observables (Roush manuscript BJPS). This is roughly because of the 
heavily theory-loaded assumptions we must make about the conditions of the world in 
order to have enough information for an evaluation of our evidence even as it pertains to 
generalizations about which observable correlations will continue. That is, the claim that 
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observations can’t confirm or undermine theoretical claims can be sustained only if we 
give up on doing science at all. (Roush 2005, 197-209) 
 The argument of this paper also stands against a new pessimistic induction 
developed recently by Kyle Stanford. (2006; see also 2000a, 2000b, 2003) The inference 
he describes involves not observables but conceivables. Stanford points out that there 
were alternative possibilities to our predecessors’ theories that were conceivable, and that 
showed our predecessors’ theories false, but which they did not conceive of. We know 
these possibilities were conceivable, because we have since conceived them. However, 
there is no reason to think we are different from them; there must also be conceivables we 
have not conceived. And, roughly, we can’t show that they don’t undermine our theories 
because we’re not conceiving of them.  
Stanford focuses not on the challenge posed by beliefs of a certain sort, those 
about unobservables, but on ways at arriving at beliefs in science, especially the method 
of elimination of alternative explanations of phenomena. Thus, the argument of this paper 
is directly relevant. To perform this induction the cases of our predecessors and ourselves 
must be relevantly similar in the basis property, which here is proposed to be the 
affliction by unconceived conceivables relevant to the theoretical question the relevant 
people in each case are investigating. This property is second-order and affects our 
predecessors’ reliability, because as we know their affliction was partly responsible for 
their believing false theories. However, granting that we also are subject to unconceived 
conceivables, the question is whether our predecessors’ unreliability that was due to this 
property says anything about us. For it to do so there must not be any other properties to 
show that we may be different from those predecessors in our reliability judging 
possibility spaces. But there have been a lot of discoveries of new methods for dealing 
with large theoretical possibility spaces. In particular, before the early 20th century 
possible alternative explanations for phenomena and experiments were ruled out seriatim. 
The early 20th century saw the blossoming of a first round of techniques for ruling out 
large classes of theories without conceiving of their members. (Roush 2005, 218-223) 
Since then, of course, there have arisen more, and more sophisticated techniques.  
Once we point out that our methods for dealing with unconceived conceivables 
are different in a way relevant to whether our theories are likely to be true, it is the 
pessimist’s burden to show that despite these differences in method we are no more 
reliable than our forebears. But more can be argued. The fact that we, unlike our 
predecessors, don’t need to conceive of possibilities in order to rule them out means that 
it is now suddenly unclear why the unconceivedness of alternative possibilities is so 
relevant to our reliability. So, it is not just that we have different (therefore possibly and 
quite plausibly better) methods for dealing with unconceived conceivables, but also that it 
is questionable that possibilities being unconceived is a worrisome phenomenon. Thus, 
our use of new techniques for dealing with possibility spaces that are relevant to whether 
we succeed breaks Stanford’s induction in two ways. It is not the burden of the optimist 
to show that we have a method good enough to rule out all possible alternative theories. 
The question is whether our predecessors’ faults should make us think we are in the same 
boat, and the pessimist has not shown that they should. 
Thinking carefully about the pessimistic induction over the history of scientific 
failures shows that it must be a meta-induction if it is to make past failures relevant to us. 
It must appeal not merely to the falsity of our predecessors’ theories but to the 
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unreliability of their ways of coming to their beliefs. But even if we grant their 
unreliability, nothing follows from this about whether we have a right to our confidence 
in our particular theories unless it is shown 1) that their unreliability is a reason to think 
we are unreliable and 2) that our believing we are unreliable forces a revision of our first-
order beliefs on us. I have argued via our desire for calibration that 2) is true. However 1) 
has not been shown, since the manifest difference in methods between us and our 
predecessors breaks the pessimist’s induction. He will have to go back to the drawing 
board and tell us why despite this we are not more likely to have true theories.  
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